The Bank of Japan's Monetary Policy and Bank Risk Premiums in the Money Market by Baba, Naohiko et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy
and Bank Risk Premiums in the Money
Market
Naohiko Baba and Motoharu Nakashima and Yosuke
Shigemi and Kazuo Ueda
17. October 2005
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/816/
MPRA Paper No. 816, posted 21. November 2006
The Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy and
Bank Risk Premiums in the Money Market∗
Naohiko Baba, Motoharu Nakashima, Yosuke Shigemi
Bank of Japan
Kazuo Ueda
University of Tokyo
Using the interest rates on negotiable certiﬁcates of
deposit issued by individual banks, we ﬁrst show that under
the Bank of Japan’s zero interest rate policy and quantitative
monetary easing policy, not just the levels of money market
rates but also the dispersion of rates across banks have fallen
to near zero. We next show that the fall in the dispersion of
the rates is not fully explained by a fall in the dispersion of
credit ratings of the banks. We also present some evidence on
the role of the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy in reducing
risk premiums.
JEL Codes: E43, E52.
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ)
monetary policy since the latter half of the 1990s, namely,
the so-called zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) and quantitative
∗The authors are grateful to Ben Bernanke for his detailed comments and
suggestions on an earlier draft of the paper. We also greatly beneﬁted from dis-
cussions with Nobu Kiyotaki and Ken Singleton, among others. Any remaining
errors are solely our responsibility. Ueda thanks the Center for Advanced Research
in Finance of the University of Tokyo for ﬁnancial assistance. The views expressed
in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of
the Bank of Japan. Author contact: Baba: Senior Economist and Director, Fi-
nancial Markets Department and Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies,
Bank of Japan; e-mail: naohiko.baba@boj.or.jp. Nakashima: Economist, Finan-
cial Markets Department, Bank of Japan; e-mail: motoharu.nakashima@boj.or.jp.
Shigemi: Director, Secretariat of the Policy Board, Bank of Japan; e-mail:
yousuke.shigemi@boj.or.jp. Ueda: Professor, University of Tokyo (formerly, Mem-
ber of the Policy Board, Bank of Japan); e-mail: ueda@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp.
105
106 International Journal of Central Banking March 2006
monetary easing policy (QMEP), on credit risk premiums demanded
of Japanese banks in the money market.
The ZIRP, the combination of a zero short-term interest rate
and a commitment to maintain it until deﬂationary concerns are
dispelled, was adopted by the BOJ between February 1999 and
August 2000.1 In March 2001, the BOJ introduced the QMEP
framework whereby the operational target of policy was changed
to the current account balances (CABs) held by the ﬁnancial in-
stitutions at the BOJ from the overnight call market rate. At the
same time, the BOJ promised to maintain the level of the bal-
ances well above required reserves until core CPI inﬂation becomes
above zero on a sustainable basis. The QMEP can be thought of
as a version of the ZIRP plus the provision of reserves well in ex-
cess of the levels necessary to achieve a zero short-term interest
rate.2
There is growing literature on the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy
near the zero lower bound on interest rates.3 The literature mostly
focuses on the eﬀects of monetary policy on interest rates on safe
assets such as government bills and bonds. An often neglected, yet
signiﬁcant aspect of the ZIRP and/or QMEP has been their eﬀects
on the credit risk premiums ﬁnancial institutions pay in the market.
That is, the BOJ’s policy has lowered such risk premiums to ex-
tremely low levels, especially in the money market. As a result, not
just the levels but also the dispersion of money market interest rates
among banks have been reduced to near zero. Such reductions in risk
premiums have been signiﬁcant in view of a sharp rise in risk pre-
miums during the 1997–98 credit/liquidity crunch, which seriously
aﬀected the overall economy.
This paper attempts to document such reductions in the disper-
sion of risk premiums across banks. In doing so, we look at the market
for negotiable certiﬁcates of deposit (NCDs) where issuance rates of
1More precisely, on February 12, 1999, the BOJ Policy Board determined to
encourage the uncollateralized overnight call rate to move as low as possible. In
April 1999, the BOJ promised to maintain a zero interest rate “until deﬂationary
concerns are dispelled.” The ZIRP was abandoned on August 11, 2000.
2The QMEP framework is still in place at the time of the writing of this paper.
3See, for example, Baba et al. (2005).
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individual banks’ NCDs are available on a weekly basis.4 Using the
data, we ﬁrst show that the standard deviation of the NCD rates
among the banks rose sharply toward the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–98,
but has declined since then. In particular, it declined with the intro-
duction of the ZIRP and declined further as the BOJ intensiﬁed its
easy policy stance with the QMEP. We then show that the declines
in risk premiums cannot be fully explained by recent improvements
in the creditworthiness of the banks.
In order to further investigate the background behind the de-
clines in risk premiums on NCD rates, we look at spreads and the
dispersion of rates on a wider range of credit instruments. We ﬁnd
that spreads and the dispersion of rates have declined in many ar-
eas of ﬁnancial markets since around 1999, including bonds issued
by both banks and nonﬁnancial corporations. We also ﬁnd, however,
that the decline in spreads on NCD issuance rates has been more
signiﬁcant than spreads on longer-term liabilities. We then carry out
a regression analysis to show that the BOJ’s monetary policy, espe-
cially the commitment to maintain a zero interest rate until deﬂation
ends under the ZIRP and QMEP, has signiﬁcantly contributed to the
decline in the dispersion of rates in the money market. While we do
not ﬁnd evidence in favor of the direct eﬀect of the higher current
account balances (CABs) under the QMEP on risk premiums, we
ﬁnd the possibility that longer-dated money market fund-supplying
operations have aﬀected risk premiums.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we
present a brief description of the NCD market in Japan. In section
2, we analyze the movements of the standard deviation of the NCD
rates over time. In section 3, we look at the relationship between the
risk premiums for individual banks and the banks’ credit ratings. We
ﬁnd that the relationship has become looser, that is, risk premiums
have declined further since the introduction of the ZIRP in 1999. In
section 4, we analyze the relationship between the declines in risk
premiums and the BOJ’s monetary policy. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
4The BOJ has collected the NCD issuance rates from the domestically licensed
banks on a weekly basis and has released the average rates on its web site.
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1. The Market for Negotiable Certiﬁcates of Deposit
(NCDs)
1.1 The Size of the NCD Market
NCDs are debt instruments issued by banks including city, regional,
trust, and foreign banks in Japan.5 NCDs were the ﬁrst-ever product
with deregulated interest rates in Japan and have been issued since
May 1979. The amount outstanding of NCDs issued by Japanese
domestically licensed banks has been moving around 30 trillion yen
in 2004. Of this total, about 80 percent is issued by major banks,
namely city and trust banks. Major banks have recently raised
around 30 percent of their total funding needs from markets by issu-
ing NCDs. Thus, NCDs can be thought of as one of their principal
instruments for raising operating funds.6
1.2 NCD Issuance by Maturity
Next, take a look at major banks’ issuance of NCDs by maturity. The
maturity of NCDs varies from a few weeks to several years. Issuances
with maturities of less than 30 days account for about 60 percent of
the total based on ﬁscal 2004 averages.7 Therefore, market liquidity
for NCDs with maturities of less than 30 days is likely to be the
highest of all the maturity zones.
2. The Dispersion of Interest Rates on Newly Issued
NCDs among Major Banks
Interest rates on major banks’ newly issued NCDs had served as
a main indicator for deregulated interest rates, although they had
moved broadly in tandem across banks for some time since the ﬁrst
NCDs were issued in May 1979. That is, the interest rates had not re-
ﬂected the diﬀerences in bank credit risks. Since the 1990s, however,
the interest rates had started to reﬂect the credit risk of individual
issuing banks, mostly due to the rising concern over the stability
5For a more detailed description of the Japanese NCD market, see chapter 7
of Totan Research (2002).
6For the size of the Japanese NCD market, see appendix ﬁgure 1 posted on
www.ijcb.org.
7For more details, see appendix ﬁgure 2 at www.ijcb.org.
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of the Japanese ﬁnancial system.8 Such concern heightened during
the period from late 1997 to 1998. This is shown in ﬁgure 1 by
substantial jumps in the degree of dispersion as measured by the
standard deviation of the NCD interest rates in November 1997.9
The standard deviations declined signiﬁcantly, however, after the
adoption of the ZIRP in February 1999 and have fallen further fol-
lowing the adoption of the QMEP in March 2001.10 It is also worth
noting that under the QMEP, the standard deviations of the inter-
est rates on newly issued NCDs declined to or even below the levels
observed before the period of ﬁnancial instability.
Table 1 reports the result of statistical tests on the diﬀerence in
the averages of the standard deviations between four subperiods of
the sample: (i) the period before ﬁnancial instability (up to Octo-
ber 1997), (ii) the period of ﬁnancial instability between November
1997 and December 1998, (iii) the ZIRP period, and (iv) the QMEP
period.11
First, the null hypothesis that the averages of the standard de-
viations were equal was rejected at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level
between the period of ﬁnancial instability and the ZIRP period. Sec-
ond, the same null hypothesis was rejected between the ZIRP and
QMEP periods. Third, it was also rejected between the preﬁnancial
instability years and the ZIRP period except for the maturity of
less than 90 days. Finally, the average is signiﬁcantly lower during
the QMEP period than in preﬁnancial instability years at all matu-
rities. Thus, we can statistically conﬁrm the following observation:
8See chapter 7 of Totan Research (2002).
9In November 1997, concern over the ﬁnancial stability heightened following
a series of failures of four ﬁnancial institutions: Sanyo Securities (November 3),
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (November 17), Yamaichi Securities (November 24),
and Tokuyo City Bank (November 26). The concern over the ﬁnancial instability
subsided after the nationalization of Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan (October
23, 1998) and Nippon Credit Bank (December 13, 1998).
10As shown by appendix ﬁgure 3 at www.ijcb.org, a similar tendency is observed
in fund-raising costs via deposits, deﬁned as payment of deposit interest rates
divided by the amount outstanding of deposits. The standard deviation of the
deposit cost lags behind the standard deviation of NCD interest rates by about
two years. This is mainly due to longer average maturity of deposits.
11Each period is deﬁned as follows. The period before ﬁnancial instability is
April 5, 1993–October 27, 1997. The period of ﬁnancial instability is November
3, 1997–December 28, 1998. The ZIRP period is February 15, 1999–August 14,
2000. The QMEP period is March 26, 2001–May 9, 2005.
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Figure 1. Standard Deviation of Interest Rates on Newly
Issued NCDs among Banks
A. Maturity of Less than 30 Days
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B. Maturity of Less than 60 Days 
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Figure 1 (continued). Standard Deviation of Interest
Rates on Newly Issued NCDs among Banks
C. Maturity of Less than 90 Days 
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Notes: Sample banks are the following banks for which weekly data are
available throughout the above period (April 5, 1993–May 9, 2005): Sum-
itomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, UFJ
Bank, Resona Bank, Shinsei Bank, Aozora Bank, the Mitsubishi Trust and
Banking Corporation, the Sumitomo Trust & Banking, Mizuho Trust &
Banking, UFJ Trust Bank, and the Chuo Mitsui Trust and Banking Com-
pany. Fuji Bank and Mizuho Bank are excluded, as a large portion of their
NCDs were issued to local governments. For Sumitomo Mitsui Banking
Corporation prior to its merger in April 2001, data for the former Sumit-
omo Bank are used.
We regarded the following dates as “event dates” and those were excluded
in calculating the average of standard deviation: (i) the end of 1999 (Y2K
problem); (ii) the end of 2000 (preparation for the introduction of RTGS
[real-time gross settlement]; (iii) the end of ﬁscal 2001 (the partial removal
of blanket deposit insurance).
Source: Bank of Japan.
the dispersion of NCD issue rates that was very high during the
period of ﬁnancial instability declined after the adoption of the ZIRP
in February 1999, and has fallen further since the adoption of the
QMEP in March 2001. Also, the levels of dispersion during the ZIRP
and QMEP periods have been lower than that in years preceding the
ﬁnancial instability.
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3. Estimating Credit Curves from Interest Rates on Newly
Issued NCDs
The interpretation of the preceding section’s ﬁnding, declines in
the standard deviation of NCD issuance rates among banks, is not
straightforward. One possible interpretation is that ﬁnancial strains
have gradually eased since 1999 and the resultant improvements of
the credit ratings for many banks have lowered the standard de-
viation as well as the levels of credit risk premiums. In order to
statistically address this issue, we estimate credit curves at various
points in time.
3.1 Estimation Method
First, we deﬁne the credit spread for a bank as the interest rate on
NCDs issued by the bank with each maturity (less than 30 days,
60 days, and 90 days) minus the weighted average of uncollateral-
ized overnight call rate over all banks.12 Then, we run cross-sectional
time-series regressions of the credit spreads on dummy variables cor-
responding to sample banks’ credit ratings for each of the following
four representative years under study: (i) 1997, the year of the ﬁnan-
cial instability, (ii) 1999, a year when the ZIRP was in full swing,
(iii) 2002, one year after the adoption of the QMEP, and (iv) 2004,
the last year of our sample period. We also estimate the credit curve
in 2005 with a view to following the most recent development. Note,
however, that it only covers the period up to May 9, 2005. Our sam-
ple consists of city and trust banks. The data on NCD rates are
available weekly, resulting in more than 500 observations for almost
all cases.13 We also include end of March, September, and December
dummies to control for seasonal market tightness in year-end and
annual/semi-annual book-closing months. The credit spreads for
each credit rating category, derived from the coeﬃcients on credit
12Precisely, the maturity of less than 60 days denotes the maturity of 60 days
to 89 days, and the maturity of less than 90 days denotes the maturity of 60 days
to 179 days, respectively.
13The number of observations for later years is smaller for the following two
reasons: (i) there have been mergers among banks; (ii) some banks were not able
to issue NCDs in later years, since their credit ratings fell below the investment
grades.
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rating dummies along with the constant term, map out the “credit
curve” for each year.
3.2 Estimated Credit Curves
The estimation result is shown in table 2.14 Dummy variables for
credit ratings are statistically signiﬁcant in many cases, particularly
for the maturity of less than 30 days. Figure 2 draws the credit curves
derived by the estimation result. As a general tendency, the credit
curves are sloped upward for ratings of A2 or lower for each maturity.
The credit curve is sloped downward between A1 and A2 for 1999
in the case of less than 30-day maturity. The number of banks with
a rating of A1 or higher, however, is very small for 1999. In fact,
the coeﬃcient on A1 dummy is insigniﬁcant for 1999. Thus, it seems
that we do not have to take this part of the result too seriously.
Figure 2 also demonstrates how the slope of the credit curve
became ﬂatter over time. A notable exception is the movement of
the spread of Baa2 rating between 1997 and 1999 for each maturity.
This coeﬃcient, however, is insigniﬁcant even at the 5 percent level in
1999. Except this, it seems fair to say that the credit curves ﬂattened
after the introduction of the ZIRP in 1999, ﬂattened further following
the introduction of the QMEP in 2002, and almost ﬂattened out in
2004 for all maturities.15
The estimation result indicates that the credit risk premiums
among major banks are currently close to zero, and that the diﬀer-
ences in credit ratings among them are now hardly reﬂected in their
fund-raising costs in the money market. Therefore, the narrowed
dispersion of fund-raising costs among banks, shown in ﬁgure 1, is
14For estimation results for maturities other than less than 30 days, see ap-
pendix table 1 at www.ijcb.org.
15For the 2004 credit curve, we statistically tested for diﬀerences in credit
spreads between credit ratings. Although the null hypothesis that the credit risk
premiums are the same was rejected between the A2 and Baa2 ratings at the
5 percent signiﬁcance level for all maturities, the null hypothesis between the
A2 and Baa1 ratings was not rejected at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level for
the maturity of less than 30 days. This result shows that the credit curve for
this maturity became completely ﬂat between the A2 and Baa1 ratings. We also
tested for diﬀerences in credit spreads between 2002 and 2004 for the same credit
ratings, and found that the null hypothesis that the credit risk premiums are
the same was rejected for Baa1, Baa2, and Baa3 for all maturities. This result
statistically supports the ﬂattening of the credit curves under the QMEP.
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Figure 2. Credit Curves of NCD Spreads
A. Maturity of Less than 30 Days 
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B. Maturity of Less than 60 Days 
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(continued)
more likely to be a result of declines in risk premiums across the
board in the money market, rather than a result of a lowered disper-
sion of credit ratings among major banks.
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Figure 2 (continued). Credit Curves of NCD Spreads
C. Maturity of Less than 90 Days 
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Notes: Each curve is drawn from parameter estimates shown in table 2.
Credit ratings are the long-term ratings of Moody’s.
4. The Flattening of Credit Curves and the BOJ’s
Monetary Policy
4.1 Three Hypotheses
In this section, we attempt to investigate further the reasons behind
the recent ﬂattening of the credit curves for NCD issuance rates,
as well as the declines in the dispersion of those rates. We came
up with at least the following three possible explanations for this
phenomenon.
First, although the analysis in the last section showed that im-
provements in banks’ credit ratings are not the whole explanation,
credit ratings may not be the best indicator of credit risks. Some-
times, they are known to lag behind evolving market perceptions of
credit risks. With a more proper measure of credit, credit curves may
not have ﬂattened.
Second, the BOJ’s monetary policy may have exerted non-
negligible eﬀects on risk premiums. There are several possibilities
here. Easy monetary policy in general, through lower interest rates,
raises asset prices and lowers risk premiums. In addition, the BOJ’s
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increasingly strong commitment to maintain a zero interest rate un-
til deﬂation ends may have played a role. Under the ZIRP (February
1999–August 2000), the BOJ committed itself to maintain a zero
short-term interest rate until “deﬂationary concerns were dispelled.”
Under the QMEP (March 2001–present), the BOJ promised to main-
tain the level of the CABs well in excess of required reserves, thus
a zero short-term interest rate until the actual and expected core
CPI inﬂation turns positive. In October 2003, the exit condition
was further clariﬁed to read “until at least actual core CPI inﬂation
and its forecast by monetary policy board members exceed zero.”
These commitments may have lowered risk premiums in the money
market by substantially reducing the risk that banks fail to meet
payment obligations, which makes the near-term chance of a default
smaller. Furthermore, the BOJ’s attempt to supply huge amounts
of excess reserves well above the levels necessary to keep short-term
interest rates around zero percent may have played a role. In order
to abide by the target on the CABs of 30–35 trillion yen, the BOJ
has had to increasingly oﬀer long-dated fund-supplying operations
in the money market.16 The average maturity of bill-purchasing op-
erations was two to three months at the start of the QMEP, but
it rose to close to nine months recently. Any banks eligible for the
BOJ’s money market operations can take such long-term funds from
the BOJ with almost zero interest rates. Arbitrage activities across
the money markets may have lowered the level and the dispersion
of rates even on instruments that are not directly used in the BOJ’s
money market operations—NCD rates, for example.
The third possible explanation for the decline in the dispersion of
NCD issuance rates is that it is partially irrational. In the environ-
ment of easy monetary policy and low returns, investors may have
carried out “reach for yield” activities aggressively, buying assets
with returns too low to be justiﬁed by rational economic calculation.
While rigorously distinguishing between these hypotheses is beyond
the scope of the present paper, in what follows we oﬀer several pieces
of evidence that we think are helpful in speculating on the impor-
tance of each.
16At the time when the QMEP was adopted in March 2001, the target on the
CABs was 5 trillion yen. It was raised several times and reached 30–35 trillion
yen in January 2004.
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4.2 Some Evidence
We ﬁrst take a look at the evolution of credit curves and the disper-
sion of rates for a wide range of ﬁnancial instruments. This exercise
will reveal that, while factors common to many instruments have
been at work, there is something distinct about the decline in risk
premiums in the money market. We then proceed to carry out a more
formal analysis concerning whether or not this distinct movement of
money market credit spreads is related to monetary policy, and, if
so, in what ways.
4.2.1 Credit Curves for Other Financial Instruments
Figure 3 shows credit curves of bond spreads with maturities of ﬁve
and ten years for banks and nonﬁnancial corporations, respectively,
which we estimated using the same methodology as in the case of
NCD credit curves.17 We can see that credit curves have become
ﬂatter over time as in the case of NCD issuance rates, but that risk
premiums seem to remain other than a few cases for 2004 and 2005:
(i) the ﬁve-year spread for banks between the ratings of A and AA
and (ii) ﬁve- and ten-year spreads for nonﬁnancial corporations be-
tween AA and AAA.18 In general, the curves are ﬂatter for ﬁve-year
maturity than ten-year maturity and for banks than for nonﬁnancial
corporations. Thus, the tendency for spreads to decline does exist
even in the long-term bond market for both banks and nonﬁnancial
corporations, but it is stronger for relatively shorter-dated bonds and
for banks.
Regarding Japanese corporate bond pricing, Nishioka and Baba
(2004) showed that narrowed credit spreads on Japanese corporate
bonds under the ZIRP and QMEP cannot be explained unless they
assume a risk-loving representative investor. This leads to an un-
derpricing of negative-skewness risk that is inherent in defaultable
bonds. Thus, together with our observation that the curves are ﬂatter
17The bond spread is deﬁned as the bond issuance rate minus the Japanese
government bond (JGB) yield with the same maturity. Credit curves are derived
by estimating credit rating dummies after controlling for year-end, semi-annual,
and ﬁscal year-end dummies. The bond yield data is available only from 2002.
18The bond issuance rates for the year 2005 cover the period up to the end of
May.
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Figure 3. Credit Curves of Bond Spreads
A. Bonds Issued by Banks
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B. Bonds Issued by Nonfinancial Corporations 
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Notes: The bond spread is deﬁned as the spread of bond issuance rate
over the JGB yields with the same maturity.
Credit curves are derived by estimating credit rating dummies after con-
trolling for year-end, semi-annual, and ﬁscal year-end dummies.
Credit ratings are the long-term ratings of Moody’s.
Number of observations is as follows: (i) bank bonds: 12/4 (ﬁve-year/ten-
year) for 2002, 13/7 for 2003, 12/12 for 2004, and 6/6 for 2005; (ii) non-
ﬁnancial corporate bonds: 66/51 for 2002, 85/67 for 2003, 82/52 for 2004,
and 21/26 for 2005, respectively.
Sources: Bloomberg, IN database.
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for banks than for nonﬁnancial corporations, the third hypothesis
above, excessive risk taking in the money and bond markets, partic-
ularly for banks, is likely to hold at least to some extent.
Next, ﬁgure 4 presents credit curves of commercial paper (CP)
issuance spreads with one- and three-month maturities.19 As in the
case with bond spreads, the curves have become ﬂatter over time.
There are, however, signiﬁcant spreads remaining at ratings of below
a-1. In particular, note that the diﬀerence in CP spreads between a-2
and a-1 in 2004 amounts to ten times as large as the largest one-notch
diﬀerence in spreads for NCD issuance rates. This diﬀerence in the
slope of credit curves is interesting. It should partially be explained
by diﬀerences in credit risks perceived by investors: banks versus
nonﬁnancial corporations. It is also interesting to look at the tight
credit spread between a-1 and a-1+. The BOJ has carried out fund-
supplying operations using CP, albeit in a repurchasing form, and
market participants seem to recognize that most of the CP eligible
for the money market operations has the rating of a-1 or higher.20
Consequently, the very ﬂat CP credit curve over the zone of a-1 or
higher is suggestive of the direct eﬀect of the BOJ’s operations on
CP rates.
4.2.2 Dispersion of Interest Rates for Other Financial
Instruments
It is also of interest to compare the dispersion of NCD issuance
rates with that of other ﬁnancial instruments. Figure 5 shows the
spreads on bank-issued bond yields over the JGB yields and the
standard deviation of those spreads across the banks. It is similar to
the case of NCD issuance rates in that the standard deviation has
declined sharply since the beginning of 2003. The dispersion of bank
bond spreads, however, rose signiﬁcantly in late 2001 and stayed high
19The CP spread is deﬁned as the CP issuance rate minus the uncollateralized
overnight call rate. The CP issuance rates are available only from 2002. Credit
curves are derived by estimating credit rating dummies after controlling for year-
end, semi-annual, and ﬁscal year-end dummies.
20The BOJ oﬃcially states the following as eligibility standards for CP: (i) those
deemed appropriate in light of relevant conditions including the creditworthiness
of an obligor, and (ii) those with an original maturity of up to one year.
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Figure 4. Credit Curves of CP Spreads
B. Three-Month Maturity
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Notes: The CP spread is deﬁned as the spread of CP issuance rate over the uncollater-
alized overnight call rate.
Credit curves are derived by estimating credit rating dummies after controlling for year-
end, semi-annual, and ﬁscal year-end dummies.
Credit ratings are the short-term ratings of Moody’s.
Number of observations is 2,327 for 2002; 1,975 for 2003; and 2,006 for 2004, respectively.
Sources: Finance Facsimile News, Bank of Japan.
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Figure 5. Dispersion of Bank Bond Spreads
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over the JGB yield with the same maturity. The maturity of most bonds
is ﬁve years.
We computed the standard deviation of bank bond yields from the date
from which more than four banks’ yield data are available.
Source: Japan Securities Dealers Association.
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until early 2003. There are some corresponding movements in the
dispersion of NCD issuance rates, but these are limited to spikes
of short duration in March 2002 and March 2003.21 The period be-
tween late 2001 and early 2003 corresponds to a recession following
the collapse of the so-called IT bubble and saw many bankruptcies of
both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial corporations. The bankruptcy of En-
ron Corporation and the resultant worldwide concerns over mutual
funds added to the stresses. The minutes of the BOJ’s monetary pol-
icy meetings in late 2001 and early 2002 reveal that the policy board
was very concerned about the rise in risk premiums in the money
and bond markets. In response, the policy board decided to raise
the target on CABs in December 2001 and also allowed the CABs
to go above the target range temporarily in the spring of 2002. The
minutes after the adoption of these measures indicate that the board
thought that the measures were successful in containing the risk pre-
miums in the money market, but not those on bonds for banks and
nonﬁnancial corporations. This episode is again indicative of diﬀer-
ent impacts of monetary policy on money market instruments from
those on others.
Figure 6 presents the movement of the standard deviation of an-
other measure of bank risk, that is, the bank default probabilities
implied by bank stock prices.22 Again, we can see the general down-
ward trend in the dispersion. The dispersion in default probabilities,
however, rose between late 2001 and the middle of 2002, declined
somewhat after that, but still remained at fairly high levels until the
middle of 2004. This pattern is roughly the same as for bank bond
yields and is not quite similar to that for NCD issuance rates.
The foregoing discussion suggests that both the levels and disper-
sion of interest rates on credit instruments, particularly those issued
21The other spikes in the dispersion of NCD issuance rates in late 1999 and late
2000 reﬂect the stress associated with the Y2K problem and the introduction of
the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) scheme into the settlement of funds and
government bonds in early 2001.
22We used the model of Merton (1974), under which default occurs at the
maturity date of debt in the event that the issuer’s assets are less than the face
value of the debt. We calculated each bank’s default probability on a monthly
basis using daily stock returns and standard deviations derived from the past
half year’s returns, together with the balance sheet data. We obtained the data
from Bloomberg. The time horizon for default is assumed to be one year.
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Figure 6. Default Probability Implied by Stock Price
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Notes: We used the model of Merton (1974) to compute the default proba-
bility for each bank. Time horizon is assumed to be one year. We calculated
each bank’s default probability on a monthly basis from daily stock returns,
together with the balance sheet data.
The number of sample banks is 102, which include city, trust, regional, and
regional II banks.
Sources: Bloomberg, Bank of Japan.
by banks, have declined, as is the case with the NCD issuance rates.
The general environment of easy monetary policy probably played
some role. There may have been an element of irrational pursuit of
yields. The discussion, however, also suggests that the decline in the
spreads or the dispersion of rates for NCDs has been more signiﬁ-
cant than those for other instruments. The rise in spreads seen in
bond rates for the period of late 2001–early 2003 is limited to very
temporary spikes in the case of NCDs. Bank bond yields and/or
bank default probabilities estimated from stock prices may be a
better indicator of bank credit risks than credit ratings. The diﬀer-
ent behavior of the dispersion of interest rates or default probabilities
between NCDs and others, however, seems to suggest that problems
of credit ratings as a measure of credit risk, the ﬁrst hypothesis in
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section 4.1 above, are not the whole explanation of our ﬁnding of ﬂat
credit curves for NCD rates.23
It would be best if we can determine the exact contribution
of monetary policy developments, irrational investor behavior, and
other factors behind the declines in spreads and the dispersion of
rates for a wide range of instruments such as bonds for banks and
nonﬁnancial corporations. This, however, would go well beyond the
scope of the present paper. Instead, we focus on the analysis of money
market rates, to which we now turn.
4.2.3 Regression Analysis on the Role of the BOJ’s Monetary
Policy
In what follows, we attempt to investigate the role the BOJ’s mon-
etary policy has played in the behavior of credit spreads for NCD
issuance rates. To that end, we extend the year-by-year regression
analysis on the credit curves of individual NCD issuance spreads by
pooling the entire cross-sectional time-series data and allowing the
slope of the credit curves to depend on the variables, including those
related to the BOJ’s monetary policy.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following model:
NCDit = (a0 + a1ZIRP+ a2QMEP+ a3TRANS
+ a4CABt + a5BONDit)∗(A1)
+ (b0 + b1ZIRP+ b2QMEP+ b3TRANS
+ b4CABt + b5BONDit)∗(A2),
+ . . .
where NCD it denotes the spread for NCD issuance rate for bank i
at time t over the weighted average of uncollateralized overnight call
rate, and BOND it denotes the spread of the bond yield for bank i
at time t over the JGB yield with the same maturity. A1 (A2 ..) de-
notes the dummy variable that takes 1 if the credit rating for bank
i at time t is A1 (A2 ..) and takes 0 otherwise.24 More importantly,
23We also analyzed the relationship between the NCD spreads and other mea-
sures of credit risk such as interest coverage ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of interest
payment to earnings, and ROA (return on assets), but could not get any robust
results.
24We also included seasonable dummies as in the estimation of credit curves
in section 3.
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we include monetary policy-related variables to investigate the rela-
tionship between the ﬂattening of NCD credit curves and the BOJ’s
monetary policy. They are dummy variables corresponding to the
BOJ’s commitments during the ZIRP and QMEP periods and the
level of aggregate CABs. That is,
ZIRP: takes on 1 when the ZIRP is in force (February 12,
1999–August 11, 2000) and 0 otherwise.
QMEP: takes on 1 when the QMEP is in force (March 19,
2001–present) and 0 otherwise.
TRANS: takes on 1 after October 10, 2003, when the BOJ en-
hanced the transparency of monetary policy and 0
otherwise.
CABt: aggregate current account balances at time t.
Those interactive terms with credit rating dummies are an at-
tempt to estimate whether or not, and to what extent, monetary
policy variables have contributed to the ﬂattening of the credit curves
that we saw in ﬁgure 2.25
The inclusion of bank bond spreads in the credit rating dummy
coeﬃcients is an attempt to allow for the possibility that credit rat-
ings are inadequate measures of bank credit. Thus, it is an attempt
to address the ﬁrst hypothesis for the decline in rate dispersion as
put forward at the beginning of this section. To the extent that bank
bond spreads reﬂect underlying bank risks more appropriately, de-
clines in spreads at each rating due to such mismeasurement should
be captured by the bond spread terms.26 The equation is estimated
for seven banks for which the bond yield data are available.27 The
data frequency is weekly and the sample period is from October 5,
1998, to May 9, 2005.
25To the extent that bank bond yields have responded to monetary policy, we
are underestimating the eﬀects of monetary policy on NCD issuance spreads.
26We also estimated the equation including the bank bond spreads as one
independent variable, not as an interactive term with credit rating dummies.
The results were essentially the same.
27Those banks are the Mizuho Corporation Bank, Shinsei Bank, Aozora Bank,
the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, UFJ
Bank, and Risona Bank.
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Table 3 reports estimation results.28 The results show that, even
after controlling for bank bond spreads, monetary policy has sig-
niﬁcantly contributed to the declines in risk premiums in the NCD
market. Speciﬁcally, the ZIRP and QMEP dummies are signiﬁcant
with the right (negative) sign in most cases. That is, the commit-
ments to maintain a zero interest rate have contributed to the decline
in the NCD credit spreads. Also, the coeﬃcients on bond spreads
are signiﬁcantly positive at credit ratings lower than Baa1 for each
maturity. This result suggests that the slope of credit curves is likely
to be signiﬁcantly ﬂatter at those ratings when bond spreads con-
tinue to decline like the period under the QMEP.
Figure 7 graphically shows the eﬀects of each commitment on the
credit curve. The eﬀects of the ﬁrst two commitments are larger at
lower ratings. For higher ratings, the eﬀects of the QMEP commit-
ment are slightly larger than those of the ZIRP commitment. Thus,
the ZIRP and QMEP commitments have ﬂattened the credit curves
for, and lowered the dispersion of, NCD issuance rates by mainly
reducing risk premiums for banks with relatively low ratings.29
In contrast, the variable CAB is either insigniﬁcant or signiﬁ-
cant with a wrong (positive) sign. We tried several variations of the
equation reported above, ﬁnding essentially the same result. That is,
there is no evidence that higher levels of CABs have reduced risk pre-
miums in the money market over and above the eﬀect of the QMEP
dummy.30
Regarding the above result, one may think that what is impor-
tant is not quite the level of the CABs per se, but the level relative
to ex ante demand for liquidity. In fact, during the period under
study, we experienced signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in the banks’ demand
for liquidity mainly due to a changing perception about the health
of the banking system. In order to take account of this possibility,
28For estimation results for maturities other than less than 30 days, see ap-
pendix table 2 at www.ijcb.org.
29The near absence of the signiﬁcant eﬀects of the third commitment is not
easy to interpret. A casual observation suggests that it stabilized JGB yields after
a spike in the summer of 2003. One possibility is that it may have inﬂuenced
longer-term yields more than money market rates by its clariﬁcation of the exit
conditions.
30Just as a robustness check on the signiﬁcance of the commitment dummies,
we estimated the above equation without including the CABs and did not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the results.
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Table 3. Regression Results on the Role of the BOJ’s
Monetary Policy: Part I
Dependent Variable: NCD Issuance Interest Rate (Less than 30 Days)
—Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate
Number of Observations: 1,929 (October 5, 1998–May 9, 2005)
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error
A1 0.056 0.204
A1∗CAB −0.001 0.006
A1∗BOND −0.051 0.261
A2 0.030 0.028
A2∗ZIRP 0.032∗∗ 0.014
A2∗QMEP −0.047∗∗∗ 0.013
A2∗TRANS −0.014 0.012
A2∗CAB 0.001∗ 0.000
A2∗BOND 0.021 0.100
A3 0.047∗∗∗ 0.009
A3∗ZIRP −0.016∗ 0.009
A3∗QMEP −0.051∗∗∗ 0.009
A3∗TRANS −0.021∗∗ 0.008
A3∗CAB 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
A3∗BOND 0.002 0.018
Baa1 −0.127 0.159
Baa1∗CAB 0.004 0.005
Baa1∗BOND 0.047 0.106
Baa2 0.060∗∗∗ 0.008
Baa2∗ZIRP −0.057∗∗∗ 0.009
Baa2∗QMEP −0.068∗∗∗ 0.009
Baa2∗TRANS −0.025∗∗ 0.010
Baa2∗CAB 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
Baa2∗BOND 0.014∗∗∗ 0.002
Baa3 0.107∗∗∗ 0.003
Baa3∗QMEP −0.166∗∗∗ 0.012
Baa3∗TRANS 0.003 0.017
Baa3∗CAB 0.002∗∗ 0.001
Baa3∗BOND 0.039∗∗∗ 0.003
Year-end dummy 0.045∗∗∗ 0.004
Fiscal year-half dummy −0.004 0.005
Fiscal year-end dummy 0.020∗∗∗ 0.004
Adjusted R-squared 0.388
Notes: Estimation is by OLS. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote the 1, 5, and 10 percent
signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Credit ratings are the long-term ratings of Moody’s.
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Figure 7. Eﬀects of the BOJ’s Monetary Policy on NCD
Credit Curves
A. Effect of the ZIRP
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(continued)
we reran the regression using the variable TERM in place of CAB.
TERM represents the monthly average of the maturity of the BOJ’s
bill-purchasing operations. At times of low demand for liquidity, the
BOJ had to oﬀer longer-dated operations to meet the target on the
CABs. In this sense, the variable may be regarded as a proxy for
an ex ante “excess supply” of liquidity in the money market. As
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Figure 7 (continued). Eﬀects of the BOJ’s Monetary
Policy on NCD Credit Curves
C. Effect of the Enhancement of Transparency
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Notes: Each curve is drawn using parameter estimates reported in
table 3.
Credit ratings are the long-term ratings of Moody’s.
shown in table 4, TERM in fact comes in negatively and is sig-
niﬁcant at many credit ratings below A1 for each maturity.31 The
rest of the estimation results, BOND coeﬃcients, are similar to the
results reported in table 3.32 Thus, we cannot deny the possibility
that increasingly longer-dated operations in the money market have
lowered risk premiums.
To summarize, monetary policy, particularly the commitments
to maintain a zero interest rate until deﬂation ends under the ZIRP
and QMEP, has contributed to the decline in the dispersion of
NCD issuance rates. The eﬀect of the quantitative easing aspect
of the QMEP on credit spreads, CABs well in excess of the levels
31For estimation results of maturities other than less than 30 days, see appendix
table 3 at www.ijcb.org.
32Since TERM is only available after January 2001, we estimated the equation
using data since then. We excluded the QMEP and TRANS dummies from the
equation since the estimation period almost coincides with the QMEP period.
Also, note that the ZIRP dummy is irrelevant in this period. TERM is available
on the BOJ web site.
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Table 4. Regression Results on the Role of the BOJ’s
Monetary Policy: Part II
Dependent Variable: NCD Issuance Interest Rate (Less than 30 Days)
—Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate
Number of Observations: 1,515 (January 4, 2001–May 9, 2005)
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error
A1 −0.059 0.042
A1∗TERM 0.010 0.007
A1∗BOND 0.062 0.143
A2 0.018 0.014
A2∗TERM −0.003 0.002
A2∗BOND 0.019 0.047
A3 0.028∗∗∗ 0.006
A3∗TERM −0.005∗∗∗ 0.001
A3∗BOND 0.015∗ 0.009
Baa1 0.038 0.024
Baa1∗TERM −0.006∗ 0.003
Baa1∗BOND −0.020 0.061
Baa2 0.040∗∗∗ 0.007
Baa2∗TERM −0.007∗∗∗ 0.002
Baa2∗BOND 0.013∗∗∗ 0.003
Baa3 0.048∗∗∗ 0.009
Baa3∗TERM −0.060∗∗ 0.002
Baa3∗BOND 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002
Year-end dummy 0.002 0.002
Fiscal year-half dummy −0.000 0.002
Fiscal year-end dummy 0.015∗∗∗ 0.002
Adjusted R-squared 0.167
Notes: Estimation is by OLS. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote the 1, 5, and
10 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Credit ratings are the long-term ratings of Moody’s.
necessary to keep a short-term interest rate zero, was less clear.
We do ﬁnd, however, some evidence that the particular types of
operations that the BOJ carried out—that is, longer-dated oper-
ations in the money market—have exerted the eﬀect of lowering
risk premiums in the money market. The informal discussion of the
spreads on CP oﬀered in this section also accords well with such a
ﬁnding.
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It is important to note that we have not attempted to estimate
the eﬀects of the BOJ’s monetary policy on a wider range of in-
struments. The commitments of the maintenance of a zero interest
rate may have had signiﬁcant eﬀects on longer-term interest rates.33
Quantitative easing and/or targeted asset purchases may have also
aﬀected asset prices other than money market rates.34
5. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that not just the levels of money market rates but
also their dispersion have declined since 1999. We have documented
this in detail for NCD issuance rates. In particular, the decline in rate
dispersion cannot be fully accounted for by improvements in bank
credit. That is, risk premiums have declined sharply across the board
in the money market. We have found a similar tendency for a decline
in spreads for longer-dated bank liabilities and for bonds issued by
nonﬁnancial corporations. Many factors, including monetary policy,
probably played a role behind the declines in risk premiums for such
a wide range of instruments.
We have provided evidence, however, for a stronger tendency
for risk premiums on NCD issuance rates to decline than for other
longer-maturity instruments, as well as for instruments issued by
nonﬁnancial corporations. We have found that the BOJ’s monetary
policy has played a role here. In particular, the commitments to
maintain a zero interest rate until deﬂationary pressure ends both
under the ZIRP and QMEP have signiﬁcantly contributed to the
declines in the spreads. We have not found a similar eﬀect from
increases in the CABs, but have identiﬁed the possibility that some
particular operations that the BOJ carried out to increase the supply
of liquidity—for example, longer-dated money market operations—
have lowered the spreads.
33Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) and Oda and Ueda (2005) present evi-
dence consistent with such a view.
34Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) ﬁnd signiﬁcant links between the BOJ’s
JGB purchases and JGB yields and between quantitative easing and stock prices.
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Appendix Table 1. Estimation Results of Credit Curves for
NCD Issuance Rates
A. Maturity of Less than 60 Days
Dependent Variable: NCD Issuance Interest Rate
—Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate
1997 1999 2002 2004 2005
Constant −0.043 0.237∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
Aa2 0.083
Aa3 0.071
A1 0.089 −0.023∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
A2 0.095 −0.195∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.033∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
A3 0.100 −0.173∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
Baa1 0.109 −0.166∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
Baa2 0.085 −0.089∗ 0.071∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
Baa3 0.179 −0.102∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.006
Year-end dummy 0.298∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.000
Fiscal year-half dummy 0.026∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.005 0.004∗∗∗
Fiscal year-end dummy 0.012 0.147∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
Adjusted R-squared 0.371 0.453 0.401 0.554 0.213
Number of observations 723 710 665 640 236
Aa2 52 0 0 0 0
Aa3 48 0 0 0 0
A1 79 8 0 47 133
A2 128 73 52 69 19
A3 52 71 207 193 28
Baa1 205 243 106 202 48
Baa2 56 216 155 56 8
Baa3 102 99 145 44 0
No rating 1 0 0 29 0
Notes: Estimation is by OLS. ***, **, and * denote the 1, 5, and 10 percent signiﬁcance
level, respectively.
The year 2005 covers the period up to May 9, 2005.
Credit ratings are the long-term ratings of Moody’s.
Appendix Table 1 (continued). Estimation Results of Credit
Curves for NCD Issuance Rates
B. Maturity of Less than 90 Days
Dependent Variable: NCD Issuance Interest Rate
—Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate
1997 1999 2002 2004 2005
Constant −0.060 0.093∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
Aa2 0.125
Aa3 0.132
A1 0.134 −0.021∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
A2 0.128 −0.079∗ −0.004 −0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
A3 0.131 −0.048 0.027∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
Baa1 0.155 −0.038 0.069∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
Baa2 0.161 0.056 0.079∗∗∗ 0.003 0.034∗∗∗
Baa3 0.210∗ 0.059 0.088∗∗∗ −0.009∗
Year-end dummy 0.129∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ −0.002 0.004∗
Fiscal year-half dummy 0.021 −0.028∗ −0.001 0.006∗∗∗
Fiscal year-end dummy −0.030∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.002
Adjusted R-squared 0.194 0.554 0.332 0.321 0.164
Number of observations 588 511 523 497 193
Aa2 52 0 0 0 0
Aa3 50 0 0 0 0
A1 74 8 0 44 126
A2 119 64 40 54 18
A3 50 70 202 177 19
Baa1 160 198 81 151 24
Baa2 31 125 122 40 6
Baa3 51 46 78 20 0
No rating 1 0 0 11 0
Notes: Estimation is by OLS. ***, **, and * denote the 1, 5, and 10 percent signiﬁcance
level, respectively.
The year 2005 covers the period up to May 9, 2005.
Credit ratings are the long-term ratings of Moody’s.
Appendix Table 2. Regression Results on the Role of the
BOJ’s Monetary Policy: Part I
A. Maturity of Less than 60 Days
Dependent Variable: NCD Issuance Interest Rate
—Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate
Number of Observations: 1,890 (October 5, 1998–May 9, 2005)
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error
A1 −0.022 0.295
A1*CAB 0.001 0.009
A1*BOND −0.134 0.378
A2 0.077∗ 0.042
A2*ZIRP 0.055∗∗ 0.021
A2*QMEP −0.092∗∗∗ 0.020
A2*TRANS −0.014 0.018
A2*CAB 0.001 0.001
A2*BOND 0.020 0.149
A3 0.116∗∗∗ 0.013
A3*ZIRP −0.026∗ 0.013
A3*QMEP −0.117∗∗∗ 0.013
A3*TRANS −0.018 0.011
A3*CAB 0.001 0.001
A3*BOND 0.015 0.027
Baa1 −0.226 0.230
Baa1*CAB 0.006 0.007
Baa1*BOND 0.142 0.156
Baa2 0.125∗∗∗ 0.011
Baa2*ZIRP −0.126∗∗∗ 0.014
Baa2*QMEP −0.146∗∗∗ 0.013
Baa2*TRANS −0.039∗∗ 0.014
Baa2*CAB 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001
Baa2*BOND 0.042∗∗∗ 0.003
Baa3 0.173∗∗∗ 0.015
Baa3*QMEP −0.242∗∗∗ 0.017
Baa3*TRANS 0.001 0.024
Baa3*CAB 0.002∗ 0.001
Baa3*BOND 0.051∗∗∗ 0.004
Year-end dummy 0.064∗∗∗ 0.005
Fiscal year-half dummy −0.004 0.005
Fiscal year-end dummy 0.028∗∗∗ 0.005
Adjusted R-squared 0.506
Notes: Estimation is by OLS. ***, **, and * denote the 1, 5, and 10 percent
signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Credit ratings are the long-term ratings of Moody’s.
Appendix Table 2 (continued). Regression Results on the
Role of the BOJ’s Monetary Policy: Part I
B. Maturity of Less than 90 Days
Dependent Variable: NCD Issuance Interest Rate
—Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate
Number of Observations: 1,540 (October 5, 1998–May 9, 2005)
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error
A1 0.034 0.247
A1*CAB −0.001 0.007
A1*BOND −0.081 0.314
A2 0.146∗∗∗ 0.041
A2*ZIRP −0.021 0.017
A2*QMEP −0.124∗∗∗ 0.018
A2*TRANS 0.005 0.018
A2*CAB −0.001 0.001
A2*BOND −0.071 0.146
A3 0.142∗∗∗ 0.011
A3*ZIRP −0.047∗∗∗ 0.011
A3*QMEP −0.146∗∗∗ 0.011
A3*TRANS −0.010 0.009
A3*CAB 0.001 0.000
A3*BOND 0.041∗ 0.023
Baa1 −0.271 0.236
Baa1*CAB 0.007 0.007
Baa1*BOND 0.269 0.165
Baa2 0.199∗∗∗ 0.013
Baa2*ZIRP −0.226∗∗∗ 0.014
Baa2*QMEP −0.218∗∗∗ 0.013
Baa2*TRANS −0.023∗ 0.014
Baa2*CAB 0.001∗∗ 0.001
Baa2*BOND 0.059∗∗∗ 0.004
Baa3 0.216∗∗∗ 0.015
Baa3*QMEP −0.255∗∗∗ 0.017
Baa3*TRANS 0.004 0.023
Baa3*CAB 0.001 0.001
Baa3*BOND 0.050∗∗∗ 0.004
Year-end dummy 0.040∗∗∗ 0.005
Fiscal year-half dummy 0.003 0.005
Fiscal year-end dummy 0.019∗∗∗ 0.005
Adjusted R-squared 0.615
Notes: Estimation is by OLS. ***, **, and * denote the 1, 5, and 10 percent
signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Credit ratings are the long-term ratings of Moody’s.
Appendix Table 3. Regression Results on the Role of the
BOJ’s Monetary Policy: Part II
A. Less than 60 Days
Dependent Variable: NCD Issuance Interest Rate
—Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate
Number of Observations: 1,490 (January 4, 2001–May 9, 2005)
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error
A1 −0.154∗∗∗ 0.049
A1*TERM 0.025∗∗∗ 0.008
A1*BOND 0.126 0.165
A2 0.022 0.016
A2*TERM −0.007∗∗∗ 0.003
A2*BOND 0.054 0.055
A3 0.048∗∗∗ 0.007
A3*TERM −0.010∗∗∗ 0.002
A3*BOND 0.026∗∗ 0.011
Baa1 0.048∗ 0.028
Baa1*TERM −0.008∗∗ 0.004
Baa1*BOND −0.015 0.071
Baa2 0.041∗∗∗ 0.008
Baa2*TERM −0.008∗∗∗ 0.002
Baa2*BOND 0.044∗∗∗ 0.004
Baa3 0.082∗∗∗ 0.010
Baa3*TERM −0.010∗∗∗ 0.003
Baa3*BOND 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003
Year-end dummy 0.006∗∗ 0.003
Fiscal year-half dummy 0.004 0.003
Fiscal year-end dummy 0.035∗∗∗ 0.003
Adjusted R-squared 0.390
Notes: Estimation is by OLS. ***, **, and * denote the 1, 5, and 10 percent
signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Credit ratings are the long-term ratings of Moody’s.
Appendix Table 3 (continued). Regression Results on the
Role of the BOJ’s Monetary Policy: Part II
B. Less than 90 Days
Dependent Variable: NCD Issuance Interest Rate
—Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate
Number of Observations: 1,248 (January 4, 2001–May 9, 2005)
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error
A1 −0.193∗∗∗ 0.053
A1*TERM 0.033∗∗∗ 0.009
A1*BOND 0.095 0.179
A2 0.055∗∗∗ 0.021
A2*TERM −0.013∗∗∗ 0.003
A2*BOND −0.028 0.066
A3 0.056∗∗∗ 0.007
A3*TERM −0.011∗∗∗ 0.002
A3*BOND 0.025∗∗ 0.011
Baa1 0.055 0.038
Baa1*TERM −0.011∗ 0.006
Baa1*BOND 0.029 0.095
Baa2 0.032∗∗∗ 0.010
Baa2*TERM −0.006∗∗∗ 0.002
Baa2*BOND 0.059∗∗∗ 0.005
Baa3 0.082∗∗∗ 0.011
Baa3*TERM −0.011∗∗∗ 0.003
Baa3*BOND 0.014∗∗∗ 0.003
Year-end dummy 0.012∗∗∗ 0.003
Fiscal year-half dummy 0.008∗∗ 0.003
Fiscal year-end dummy 0.048∗∗∗ 0.003
Adjusted R-squared 0.448
Notes: Estimation is by OLS. ***, **, and * denote the 1, 5, and 10 percent
signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Credit ratings are the long-term ratings of Moody’s.
Appendix Figure 1. Size of the NCD Market
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Source: Bank of Japan.
Appendix Figure 2. NCD Issuance by Maturity
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Appendix Figure 3. Standard Deviation of Fund-Raising
Costs via Deposits Among Banks
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